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What Is the Relationship Between Language and Thought?:
Linguistic Relativity and Its Implications for Copyright
Christopher S. Yoo *

ABSTRACT

To date, copyright scholarship has almost completely overlooked the
linguistics and cognitive psychology literature exploring the connection between
language and thought. An exploration of the two major strains of this literature,
known as universal grammar (associated with Noam Chomsky) and linguistic
relativity (centered around the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), offers insights into the
copyrightability of constructed languages and of the type of software packages at
issue in Google v. Oracle recently decided by the Supreme Court. It turns to
modularity theory as the key idea unifying the analysis of both languages and
software in ways that suggest that the information filtering associated with the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be a general strategy for managing complex systems
that is not restricted to language. It also examines Jerry Fodor’s application of
modularity theory to cognition and his Language of Thought Hypothesis to see
what they reveal about the idea-expression dichotomy.
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
I.
Exploring Relationship Between Language and Thought .................................................. 5
A.
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and Linguistic Relativity ..........................................6
B.
Chomsky and Universal Grammar.........................................................................13
C.
The Revival of Linguistic Relativity......................................................................18
II.
Linguistic Relativity and Constructed Languages ............................................................ 26
A.
Types of Constructed Languages ...........................................................................27
1.
Artistic Languages .....................................................................................28
2.
Auxiliary Languages ..................................................................................32
3.
Engineered Languages ...............................................................................35
B.
The Implications of the Linguistic Relativity Debate ............................................36
1.
Universal Grammar ....................................................................................37
2.
Linguistic Relativity...................................................................................39
3.
Differences Among Types of Constructed Languages ..............................41
4.
Copyright as a Mechanism for Control ......................................................49
III.
Linguistic Relativity and Software ................................................................................... 52
A.
Universal Grammar ................................................................................................54
B.
Linguistic Relativity...............................................................................................55

John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science and Founding
Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank participants in the Inaugural Copyright Scholarship Roundtable at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
the 2018 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the 2019 Intellectual Property and Information Law Speaker
Series, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, and the 2019 Chicago IP Colloquium for their comments on earlier drafts
of this paper and Erica Smith, Jessica Sun, and Michael Wall for their expert research assistance.

*

1

C.
Modularity Theory as the Bridge Between Languages and Software ...................59
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 64
INTRODUCTION
What is the connection between language and thought? Much of copyright depends on
the answer to that question being “not much.” For example, copyright has long distinguished by
the ideas being expressed and the words used to express them, with legal protection being
reserved exclusively for the latter. 1 The Court relied on this dichotomy when rejecting
arguments that copyright violates the First Amendment, concluding that giving authors exclusive
control over certain expression does not prevent others from articulating the same ideas using
different words. 2 Limits to the dichotomy also underlie the “merger doctrine,” which denies
copyright protection when there is only one way to express an idea way for the simple reason
that exclusive control over the expression would be tantamount to control over the idea itself. 3
Despite the foundational character of these principles, the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 4 offered hints of ways that language and
thought may enjoy a deeper connection than is generally recognized. In holding that Google’s
use of the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) created for Java by Oracle’s predecessor,

For the seminal statement, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). For further statements, see
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2021); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012); Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Feist Publc’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); Harper
& Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
2
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (holding that the “idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still
protecting an author's expression”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (holding that the idea-expression dichotomy constituted
one of two “built-in First Amendment accommodations” included in copyright, quoting Harper & Row).
3
Although the doctrine is typically viewed as originating in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), Pamela
Samuelson’s careful review of the doctrinal history concludes that it actually originated in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev’d, 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). See
Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 417, 419–25
(2016).
4
141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
1

2

Sun Microsystems, constituted fair use, it recognized that APIs play a critical organizing
function that arranges and groups tasks in a particular way. 5 The Court supported this
observation with a “rough analogy” to the way spoken languages “divides into sets of concepts a
world that in certain respects other languages might have divided differently.” 6
Although the opinion cited no authority as support for this analogy, the Court’s
observation tied into a long-running debate in the fields of linguistics and cognitive psychology
over the extent to which thought and language are independent of one another. The linguistic
relativity school, animated by the concept known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, asserts that
people think in terms of specific languages and that the native language that a person speaks
shapes the way that person perceives the world. 7 Such claims also resonate with claims that
some concepts cannot be translated into other languages and that thinking in another language
often involves a different mode of thought, the inherent sexism of using of “he” as the dominant
indefinite pronoun, 8 and the frequent observation that training in the language of the law teaches
students to “think like a lawyer.” 9 It also appears prominently in fiction, with the most familiar
example likely being George Orwell’s 1984, in which the government created a language called
“Newspeak” based on the premise its structure would prevent people from thinking certain
thoughts. 10 Other prominent examples exist as well. 11

Id. at 1192.
Id.
7
The term was coined by a student of Edward Sapir. See Harry Hoijer, The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, in
LANGUAGE IN CULTURE: CONFERENCE ON THE INTERRELATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND OTHER ASPECTS OF CULTURE
92 (Harry Hoijer ed., 1954).
8
See Jane H. Hill & Bruce Mannheim, Language and World View, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 381, 387–
90 (1992) (providing a survey of early research on this topic).
9
See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 17–
18, 28 (2007) (providing an argument based on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that teaching law students to use certain
language shapes their perceptions and influences their orientations).
10
Appendix: The Principles of Newspeak, in GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 303 (1949).
5
6
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Other scholars have sharply contested the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Most notably, Noam
Chomsky’s theory of universal grammar downplays the impact of context and instead contends
that genetics and biology lead all speech to follow a set of uniform syntactic rules. 12 The
controversy has ebbed and flowed over the years, with different sides holding preeminence at
different times. 13 At this point, the last word seems far from being said.
Despite the key role that the putative independence between language and thought plays
in key copyright doctrines, copyright scholars have paid virtually no attention to these important
lines of research, and an extended discussion analysis of its insights and limitations has yet to
appear in the legal academic literature. 14 No article have explored its implications for
foundational concepts such as the idea-expression dichotomy, the related merger doctrine, and
the exclusion of the functional aspects of works.
This Article seeks to fill this void by exploring these competing schools of thought and
their importance for copyright law. Part I lays out the debate between linguistic relativity and
universal grammar. Given the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’s emphasis on how language structures

For example, Robert Heinlein describes “Speedtalk,” a language in which the faster communication made
possible by the compression of words into single syllables promotes superintelligence. Robert Heinlein, Gulf,
ASTOUNDING FICTION, Nov. 1949, at _. He also refers to the engineered language, Loglan, in ROBERT HEINLEIN,
THE MOON IS HARSH MISTRESS 13, 17, 19, 381 (1966). On a lighter note, the character, Amy Farah Fowler, in the
popular television series, The Big Bang Theory, twice refers to languages she has constructed. The Big Bang
Theory: The Skank Reflex Analysis (CBS television broadcast Sept. 22, 2011); The Big Bang Theory: The
Deception Verification (CBS television broadcast Sept. 26, 2013).
12
See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES xii (1957).
13
See, e.g., Joshua Hartshorne, Does Language Shape What We Think?, SCI. AM. MIND (Aug. 18, 2009),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-language-shape-what/.
14
The only discussion of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of any note appearing in the copyright literature appears
to be a two-page passage in Fred Koenigsberg’s Meyer Lecture. I. Fred Koenigsberg, Humpty Dumpty in
Copyrightland, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 677, 678–80 (2004). A student note on constructed languages
mentions linguistic relativity when describing the origins of Loglan without analyzing it in any depth. Michael
Adelman, Note, Constructed Languages and Copyright: A Brief History and Proposal for Divorce, 27 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 544, 548 (2014). Michael Madison has alluded to the concept in footnotes. See Michael J. Madison, A
Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1631 n.469 (2004); Michael J. Madison,
Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. REV. 433, 439 n.25 (2003).
11
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affect thought, the next two Parts discuss the implications of this debate for the copyrightability
of different types of languages: Part II considers the colorful world of constructed languages,
such as Tolkien’s elvish and Esperanto, analyzing how different types are animated by different
goals and discussing the role of copyright in furthering those goals. Part III addresses the
application of copyright to software, paying particular attention to the “rough analogy” between
software and natural languages drawn by the Supreme Court in Google LLC v. Oracle America,
Inc. 15 It uses modularity theory as the key idea unifying the analysis of both languages and
software in ways that suggest that the information filtering functions associated with the SapirWhorf hypothesis may be a general strategy for managing complex systems that has importance
far beyond language. It also briefly examines Jerry Fodor’s application of modularity theory to
cognition to see what it reveals about the idea-expression dichotomy.
A better understanding of these cutting-edge debates in linguistics and cognitive
psychology promises to provide new insights into key aspects of copyright law. I hope that it
also provides a contribution to the emerging field of law and linguistics. 16
I.

EXPLORING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

The debate over the relationship between language and thought has lasted for over a
century. Part A traces the early 20th century rise of what has become known as the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, which contends that the grammatical structure of a person’s native language
influences the way people perceive the world. Part B discusses the emergence of universal
grammar during the 1960s and its implication that all languages embody the same structure,
141. S. Ct. 1183, 1192 (2021).
See Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
769 (1995); The Syntax of Justice Conference, NORTHEASTERN UNIV. (Apr 13, 2017),
https://cos.northeastern.edu/news/syntax-justice-conference/.
15
16
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which in turn suggests that language structures cannot have a differential impact on the way
people think. Part C examines the revival of interest in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that began in
the 1990s, which shifted focus away from the impact of a language’s grammatical structure and
towards the context in which particular language is used.
A.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and Linguistic Relativity
Although discussions of linguistic relativity are generally framed in terms of the “Sapir-

Whorf Hypothesis,” the appellation is widely regarded as something of a misnomer. 17 In the
words of Hill and Mannheim, “just as the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor
an empire, the ‘Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’ is neither consistent with the writings of Sapir and
Whorf, nor a hypothesis.” 18
Although theories about the connection between language and thought has other
historical antecedents, 19 Frank Boas, who is widely recognized the founder of anthropology in
the U.S., is generally credited for introducing it into the modern debate. Boas broke with the

See, e.g., Caleb Everett, Evidence for Language-mediated Thought in the Perception of Non-gendered
Figures, 52 TEX. LINGUISTIC F. 24, 24 (2008); He Jing, The Validity of Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis—Rethinking the
Relationship Among Language, Thought and Culture, 9 US-CHINA FOREIGN LANGUAGE 560, 561 (2011); Maia
Kutateladze, Language Definition and Its Relation to Culture, PROC. 6TH INT’L CONF. ON AM. STUD. 10, 14 (2008);
available at
https://eduhum.ibsu.edu.ge/old/files/Menu%20Items/6th_International_Conference_on_American_Studies.pdf;
Bruce I. Kodish, What We Do with Language – What It Does with Us, 60 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 383, 384
(2003–2004).
18
Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 386.
19
The theory has roots in the 19th-century writings of Vico and Wilhelm von Humboldt. For overviews of
the historical roots, see DELL H. HYMES, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); J.P. PENN,
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY VERSUS INNATE IDEAS: THE ORIGINS OF THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS IN GERMAN
THOUGHT (1972); Danny K.H. Alford, Benjamin Whorf Revisited, Part I: Demise of the Whorf Hypothesis, 4
PHOENIX: NEW DIRECTIONS STUD. MAN 84, 94–96 (1980); Ranjit Chatterjee, Reading Whorf Through Wittgenstein:
A Solution to the Linguistic Relativity Problem, 93 LINGUA 37, 40–43 (1985); John J. Gumperz & Stephen C.
Levinson, Introduction: Linguistic Relativity Re-Examined, in RETHINKING LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY 1, 4–5 (John J.
Gumperz & Stephen C. Levinson eds., 1996); John E. Joseph, The Immediate Sources of the “Sapir WhorfHypothesis,” 23 HISTORIOGRAPHIA LINGUISTICA 365 (1996); E.F. Konrad Koerner, The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: A
Preliminary History and a Bibliographical Essay, 2 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1992).
17
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conventional wisdom of the day that regarded Western European cultures and languages as
superior to others in favor of a belief that all languages and cultures are of equal worth. Boas
rejected claims that the structure of a language limited its speakers’ ability to engage in abstract
thought. 20 Interestingly, at times Boas appeared to endorse the existence of a fundamental
grammar that spans all languages based in fundamental psychological processes 21 that preexist
language, 22 while on other occasions he emphasizes how the grammar of different languages
may incorporate “different fundamental categories.” 23
Boas’s student, Edward Sapir, extended his work by taking a more systematic approach
to the study of language. 24 Sapir believed that “[l]anguage is a guide to ‘social reality’” and that
“[h]uman beings . . . are very much at the mercy of the particular language that has become the
medium of expression for their society.” 25 As a result, “the ‘real world’ is to a large extent
unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group,” with different languages creating a
different “social reality” and speakers of different languages live in “distinct worlds, not merely
the same world with different labels attached.” 26 Like Boas, Sapir stopped short of advancing
the deterministic claim that a person’s native language limits their ability to perceive reality or

Franz Boas, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANGUAGES, PART 1, at 1, 64 (1911) (“It
seems very questionable in how far the restriction of the use of certain grammatical forms can really be conceived as
a hindrance in the formulation of generalized ideas. It seems much more likely that the lack of these forms is due to
the lack of their need.”).
21
Id. at 71 (concluding that “the occurrence of the most fundamental grammatical concepts in all languages
must be considered as proof of the unity of fundamental psychological processes”); id. at 43 (averring that “in each
language only part of the complete concept we have in mind is expressed”).
22
Id. at 43 (opining that “each language has a peculiar tendency to select this or that aspect of the mental
image which is conveyed by the expression of the thought”).
23
Id. at 43.
24
See generally EDWARD SAPIR, SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPIR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND
PERSONALITY (David G. Mandelbaum ed., 1983).
25
Edward Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a Science, 5 LANGUAGE 207, 209 (1929).
26
Id.
20
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conceive of ideas, stating, “It would be naïve to imagine that any analysis of experience is
dependent on pattern expressed in language.” 27
But the locus classicus of linguistic relativity was provided by an unlikely person,
Benjamin Whorf. 28 A chemical engineer by training and profession who studied linguistics
under Sapir at Yale, Whorf remained outside the academy his entire career and published his key
works in nontraditional journals. 29 His work did not become widely known until the posthumous
publication of a collection of his works in 1956 following his untimely death at the age of fortyfour. 30
Beyond studying mere words, Whorf analyzed the structure and the grammar of Native
American languages. He observed that language represents the primary way that human beings
organize the “kaleidoscopic flux of impressions” that bombard them every day. 31 Individuals do
not create those categories themselves. Instead, all speakers are “parties to an agreement” to
organize those concepts in a particular way, and that “agreement . . . holds through our speech
community and is codified in the patterns of our language.” 32 As a result, the categories
presented by any particular language are “absolutely obligatory.” 33 Indeed, “we cannot talk at all
except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement

Edward Sapir & Morris Swadesh, American Indian Grammatical Categories, 2 Word 103 (1946), reprinted
in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF EDWARD SAPIR 133, 140 (William Bright ed., 1990).
28
Gumperz & Levinson, supra note 19, at 5; Koerner, supra note 19, at 181.
29
John B. Carroll, Introduction, in BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 1, 3–5, 16, 18–20 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956). Apparently, Whorf only
prepared a single article for an audience of linguists. Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 390.
30
WHORF, supra note 29.
31
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42 TECH. REV. 229 (1940), reprinted in BENJAMIN LEE
WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 207, 213 (John B.
Carroll ed., 1956).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 213–14.
27

8

decrees.” 34 Thus, “no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is
constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free.” 35
The saliences and exclusions embedded in any particular language in turn filter the way
its speakers view the world, channeling them towards different perceptions of the same physical
phenomena. 36 As Whorf noted, “users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their
grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar
acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive at somewhat
different views of the world.” 37 From this perspective, “the background linguistic system (in
other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing
ideas but rather is itself a shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual’s mental
activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade.” 38
Thus, “[e]very language and every well-knit technical sublanguage incorporates certain
points of view and certain patterned resistances to widely divergent points of view.” 39 In other
words of the editor of Whorf’s collected writings, “the structure of a human being’s language
influences the manner in which he understands reality and behaves with respect to it.” 40

Id. at 214.
Id.
36
Whorf, supra note 31, at 214.
37
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Linguistics as an Inexact Science, 43 TECH. REV. 61 (1940), reprinted in WHORF,
supra note 29, at 220, 221.
38
Whorf, supra note 31, at 212.
39
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Mind, and Reality, THEOSOPHIST, Jan./Apr. 1942, reprinted in WHORF,
supra note 29, at 246, 246–47. In this way, Whorf sounded themes that anticipated the influential work, THOMAS R.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1955). Whorf observed, “These resistances not only isolate
artificially the particular sciences from each other; they also restrain scientific spirit as a whole from taking the next
great step in development—a step which entails viewpoints unprecedented in science and a complete severance from
traditions.” Whorf, supra, 247
40
John B. Carroll, Introduction, in WHORF, supra note 29, at 1, 23.
34
35
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Language constrains thought and action 41 and renders linguistically codable concepts more
salient and memorable. 42
Moreover, people become so habituated to the patterns embodied in their native
languages that they internalize them in ways that affect their experiences, feelings, and
orientation to the rest of the world. 43 The result is a “new principle of relativity, which holds that
all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless
their linguistic backgrounds are similar.” 44
Whorf supported his claims with empirical observations. For example, Whorf asserted
that the fact that the Inuit language contained more distinct words for snow than other languages
permitted the Inuit people to perceive a greater variety of distinctions between different types of
snow. 45 Whorf also claimed that the fact that the Hopi language perceived of time as a
continuous process instead of as a series of discrete, countable instances caused them to perceive
space and time differently. 46 He regarded Hopi as proving that Newtonian conceptions of time
and space are the product of culture and language instead of being the result of objective
observations of an underlying universal reality. 47

STANLEY R. BARRETT, ANTHROPOLOGY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THEORY AND METHOD 20 (1996).
JOHN LYONS, LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 305 (1981).
43
GUY DEUTSCHER, THROUGH THE LANGUAGE GLASS: WHY THE WORLD LOOKS DIFFERENT IN OTHER
LANGUAGES 5, 187, 208 (2010).
44
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42 TECH. REV. 229 (1940), available at
https://archive.org/details/MIT-Technology-Review-1940-04/page/n15/, reprinted in BENJAMIN WHORF,
LANGUAGES, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 233, 244 (John B. Carroll
ed., 1956).
45
Whorf, supra note 31, at 216. The observation was first advanced by Sapir’s teacher, Franz Boas,
Introduction, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN LANGUAGES, PART 1, at 1, 21–22 (Franz Boas ed., 1911).
46
Benjamin Whorf, The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi, 12 LANGUAGE 127 (1936),
reprinted in LANGUAGES, THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 44, at 51.
47
Benjamin Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE,
AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD SAPIR 75 (Leslie Spier ed., 1941), reprinted in LANGUAGES,
THOUGHT, AND REALITY, supra note 44, at 134, 152–53. Whorf reportedly believed that this difference in language
41
42
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Methodologically, Boas, Sapir, and Whorf shared a belief that linguistics required the
deep, contextual study of specific languages as they are actually practiced. In so doing, they
disagreed with those favoring the abstract study of languages, who believed that language and
culture were distinct and that insight could be obtained without fluency in the language being
studied. 48
These linguistic theories have deep philosophical roots as well. For example, Immanuel
Kant built on the Platonic vision of a real world cannot be directly perceived, which he called the
noumenal world. Instead, people could perceive of the phenomenal world, which is the product
of physical the senses interpreted through a person’s categories of understanding. 49 Ludwig
Wittgenstein explicitly tied cognition to language when he averred, “The litmus of my language
means the limits of the world” and “[a]bout which one cannot speak, one must remain silent.” 50
Friedrich Nietzsche famously called language a “prison house” that shapes thought. 51 Bertrand
Russell believed that the “logically perfect language” he had created “will be completely
analytic, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or denied.” 52 Other
philosophers argued that different languages can offer different representations of the world, 53
including such notables as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Gottfried Leibniz, who

would permit Hopi to understand Einstein’s theory of relativity more easily. Frank Heynick, From Einstein to
Whorf: Space, Time, Matter, and Reference Frames in Physical and Linguistic Relativity, 45 SEMIOTICA 35 (1983).
48
Hill & Mannheim, supra note 8, at 386.
49
See M.A. Smirnov, Kantian Philosophy and “Linguistic Kantianism, 37 KANTIAN J. 32 (2018); Ralph L.
Carnes, A Perceptual Model of the Whorfian Hypothesis, 71 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 263, 265–68 (2014). On
the connections between Plato and linguistic relativism, see T.D. Crawford, Plato’s Reasoning and the Sapir-Whorf
Hypothesis, 13 METAPHILOSOPHY 217 (1982).
50
See Ranjit Chatterjee, Reading Whorf Through Wittgenstein: A Solution to the Linguistic Relativity
Problem, 67 LINGUA 37 (1985).
51
See Graham Parkes, Nietzsche on the Fabric(ation) of Experience, 9/10 J. NIETZSCHE STUD. 7, 25–26
(1995). Robert P. Pula, The Nietzsche-Korzybski-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?, 49 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 50
(1992); Tracy B. Strong, Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche’s Critique of Epistemology, 3 THEORY & SOC’Y 239
(1976); Bradd Shore, Is Language a Prisonhouse?, 2 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 115, 117–20 (1987).
52
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 58 (1918).
53
WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORLD AND OBJECT 51–57 (1965).
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speculated that an artificially constructed language “could more accurately capture the true
essence of things.” 54 Thomas Kuhn’ would later offer a related argument in the field of the
history of science, asserting that the paradigm under which scientists operate at any particular
time filter the way they perceive data and can even lead them to reject valid data that are
inconsistent with that paradigm. 55
The literature began to distinguish between strong and weak versions of the hypothesis. 56
The strong version, often called linguistic determinism, claims that a person’s native language
determines her thought and worldview. 57 The weak version more modestly claims that a
person’s native language influences her thoughts and worldview, typically called linguistic
relativity, which regards thought and action as linguistically and socially mediated. 58
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis commanded considerable attention during the 1950s and
1960s, generating a significant body of supportive scholarship and series of conferences devoted
to the topic. 59 Early empirical studies seemed to confirm the weak version of the hypothesis by
showing speakers of different languages could better remember colors that were more salient in
their native language. 60 Another oft-cited study conducted by Alfred Bloom claimed that the
fact that the Chinese lacks a subjunctive voice made it more difficult for Chinese speakers to

Joshua Foer, Utopian for Beginners: An Amateur Linguist Loses Control of the Language He Invented,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 24, 2012, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/12/24/utopian-forbeginners.
55
KUHN, supra note 39.
56
DAN I. SLOBIN, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 122 (1971).
57
Id. at 120.
58
SLOBIN, supra note 56, at 120.
59
Koerner, supra note 19, at 182; DELL H. HYMES, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY
174–76 (1983); ROBERT L. MILLER, THE LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY PRINCIPLE AND HUMBOLDTIAN
ETHNOLINGUISTICS: A HISTORY AND APPRAISAL 12 n.6 (1968).
60
For brief surveys of the early empirical literature, see Paul Kay & Willett Kempten, What Is the SapirWhorf Hypothesis?, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (n.s.) 65, 66–67 (1984); and LYONS, supra note 42, at 307–22.
54
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understand counterfactuals. 61 Through the first half of the twentieth century, linguistic relativity
had clearly established itself as the organizing principle for studying the connection between
language and thought. 62
B.

Chomsky and Universal Grammar
The 1960s witnessed the rise of a new school of thought championed by Noam Chomsky

that rejected the importance of linguistic differences and instead conceived of language in more
universal terms. Chomsky’s theory was a response to the behaviorism of B.F. Skinner that was
the dominant paradigm of the day that sought to explain language as the environmental product
of stimulus-response and eschewed any analysis of psychological processes. 63 Behaviorism
treated internal mental processes as a black box and focused on predicting future actions based
on evidence from the past. 64
Chomsky countered that children could not possibly be exposed to sufficiently stimuli in
the time they learn language for contextual factors to be the sole explanation. 65 Instead, all
languages must reflect a universal grammar that is genetically encoded into all people, reflected
in his now famous claim that people innately regard the structure of the sentence, “colorless
green ideas sleep furiously,” as grammatically correct even though the sentence is itself
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meaningless. 66 Language acquisition involves learning the meanings; children’s understanding
of grammatical structure is, in contrast, innate.
The existence of such a universal grammar would undercut claims that differences in the
structures of different languages could have any impact on the way a person thought or saw the
world. Moreover, it favors approaching “language acquisition as a logical problem that can be
solved in principle without looking at the development of actual children in detail.” 67 As a
result, Chomsky was sharply critical of the Whorfian connection between grammatical categories
and world view as well as his bottom-up contextual approach to studying language. 68
At the same time, linguistic relativity also received a strong challenge from cognitive
psychology, which began emphasizing “the commonality of human cognition and its basis in
human genetic endowment.” 69 For example, Steven Pinker argues that thought is completely
independent of language and rejects the idea that people think in a native language. 70 Instead,
Pinker asserts that people think in a meta-language he calls “mentalese.” 71 To these scholars,
language ability is a genetic trait shared by the entire human race. 72
An empirical literature began to emerge that sought to corroborate universal grammar.
For example, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay showed that different languages that used the same
number of focal colors tended to use the same colors, suggesting that the concept of colors likely
have a biological root. 73 Other studies attempted to debunk the specific examples regarding
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references to time in Hopi (even calling it “hoax”), 74 the number of words for describing snow in
Inuit, 75 and the Chinese language’s inability to reflect counterfactuals, 76 with one study
characterizing the scholarship on Inuit as a “hoax.” 77 Others focused their criticism on the
inherent circularity in experimental designs that rely on language to determine what a person is
thinking. As Daniel Casasanto helpfully summarizes the critique, “the only evidence that people
who talk differently also think differently is that they talk differently!” 78 The basic principle that
correlation cannot prove causation means that the causal direction of the effect is ambiguous and
that both effects may be caused by a third unobserved factor. Attempts to conduct field tests of
the hypothesis failed when the community supporting the test language fragmented. 79
Interestingly, the differences between Chomsky’s views on the one hand and Boas’s,
Sapir’s, and Whorf’s views on the other hand may not have been as extreme as is sometimes
surmised. In the words of one commentator, “Boas, Sapir, and Whorf were not relativists in the
extreme sense often suggested by modem critics, but assumed instead a more limited position,
recognizing that linguistic and cultural particulars intersect with universals.” 80 Indeed, Whorf
recognized the existence of “a universal . . . way of linking experiences which shows up in
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laboratory experiments and appears to be independent of language—basically alike for all
persons.” 81
Nonetheless, advocates of the universal grammar adopted a surprisingly dismissive and
combative tone when criticizing Whorf’s work. 82 Other attacks against linguistic relativity have
been more ad hominem. For example, instead of engaging with the merits of Whorf’s work,
some critics attempted to dismiss him as an amateur. 83 Others have defended Whorf and other
linguistic relativists against these attacks. They argued that many of the attacks are based on
mischaracterizations of Whorf’s work. 84 Others attempted to rebut the challenges to Whorf’s
examples, 85 noting that the derisive tone of these critiques “hindered sophisticated discussion
about the issues” and that the critics’ analysis fell prey to the same flaws they accused Whorf of
perpetrating. 86 As for the personal criticisms leveled at Whorf, his supporters point to the
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recognition he received during his lifetime 87 and recharacterized being called an amateur as a
badge of honor worthy of the word’s noble origins as “a lover of the subject” 88 that more
reflected the shortcomings of linguistics as an academic profession than any deficiencies in
Whorf’s work. 89
Despite these efforts to defend linguistic relativity, by the 1980s, Chomsky’s theory of
universal grammar emerged as the dominant paradigm, 90 and linguistic relativity was clearly in
decline. 91 Even as sympathetic an observer as the editor of the landmark 1956 compilation of
Whorf’s works was forced to conclude in 1992 that “most linguists and psychologists believe
that evidence offered in [the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’s] support is flawed” and that the SapirWhorf hypothesis “has come to be regarded as either unconfirmable or incorrect.” 92 Steven
Pinker even authored what he called its “obituary,” calling it “wrong, all wrong” and “a
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conventional absurdity.” 93 Some commentators even spoke of its death or its demise and
conducted autopsies exploring why. 94 Konrad Koerner more optimistically predicted a revival of
interest in the 1990s. 95
C.

The Revival of Linguistic Relativity
Koerner was ultimately proved correct: Since the 1990s, linguistic relativity has enjoyed

something of a renaissance. 96 The intellectual focus has shifted away from the purported impact
that a language’s structure and grammar can have on people’s thoughts. Instead, scholars have
begun exploring the impact that contextual uses of certain language can have on people’s
thoughts.
A new generation of empiricists has begun to explore new dimensions of linguistic
relativity. 97 Paul Kay, who coauthored the study widely regarded as establishing color as a
universal concept, 98 conducted new experiments indicating that “a more cautious Whorfianism
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seems to be supported by the results reported here.” 99 Other color studies have found similar
effects. 100 Studies focusing on spatial characterizations in language have shown that members of
an aboriginal culture in Australia whose language describes space in cardinal-direction terms
(north, south, east, west) demonstrated better spatial knowledge and arranged items in sequence
in a different manner (east-to-west) than did speakers of language who describe space in relativedirection terms (left, right, forward, backward). 101
Other studies suggest that speakers of languages that use horizontal metaphors for time
perceive the world differently than speakers of languages that use vertical metaphors for time. 102
Similarly, the ability to estimate duration of time varied based on whether the speaker’s language
measured to duration in terms of length (long, short) instead of amount (big, little). 103 Still other
studies have examined how grammatical gender in a language can affect perception. 104 New
research methods have emerged, such as those studying the perception of motion and emotion 105
and those comparing bilingual and monolingual speakers. 106 Perhaps most celebratedly, the fact
that the language spoken by Brazil’s Pirahã tribe lacks many supposedly universal features of
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language, including numbers, color, dependent clauses, myths, fiction, and art and used the
simplest forms of pronouns and kinship references raises doubts about the universality of certain
language structures. 107 Indeed, the lack of numbers appears to limit the Pirahã’s ability to do
mathematics. 108
One of the more recent forays into the ways that language can affect thought is known as
evidentiality, 109 which has become a hot topic in linguistics circles. 110 Although the concept was
first recognized by Boas, 111 Roman Jakobson introduced the term “evidential” into the linguistic
vocabulary in 1957. 112 Languages that use evidentials mandate as part of their grammar that the
speaker “specify the information source in which a statement is based—whether the speaker saw
the event happen, didn’t see it but heard it (or smelt it), made an inference about it based on
visual traces or reasoning or general knowledge, or was told about it.” 113 Evidentials’ obligatory
nature in these languages increases the availability and salience of information sources 114 and
accents “[t]he distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other.’” 115 They also require a level of specificity
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that can change discourse and politics. 116 Their use also becomes embedded in social
practices. 117 Indeed, those coming from language traditions requiring evidentials feel the gap
when speaking languages that do not require them. 118 These speakers may even greet the failure
to provide the evidential provenance of reported information with suspicion. 119 Moreover,
evidentiality’s implications for linguistic relativity are clear. 120
A shift in developmental psychology, while continuing to recognize the importance of
universals, began to place renewed emphasis on the role that cultural context plays. 121 At the
same time, linguistics and anthropology have focused increased attention on how the ways that
language is used can create meaning in ways that go beyond lexicon and grammar in ways that
seem culturally specific. For example, Alan Rumsey followed Whorf’s structural approach and
compared European languages’ ability to report the exact wording of quoted speech and the lack
of similar structures in the language of the Ngarinyin people of northwestern Australia. 122
George Lakoff argued that the key to understanding language is not its structure and its grammar,
but rather the metaphors that it embodies, which can affect the way speakers of the language
perceive different phenomena. 123
The linguistic relativity revival has also drawn support from the perceived inadequacies
of universal grammar, which Chomsky initially refined into a theory known as Principles and
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Parameters. 124 The difficulties Chomsky faced in reducing all languages into a single universal
grammar led him to divide grammar into a core, which consisted of the part subject to the
universal grammar, and a periphery, which is “whatever is added on in the system actually
represented in the mind/brain of a speaker-hearer.” 125 Chomsky later reformulated his thoughts
still further into what he now calls the Minimalist Program, which discards almost all of the
previous analytical categories and attempts to identify the attributes for reducing language to its
bare essentials. 126
Critics regard the core/periphery distinction as a telling acknowledgement of the
inadequacies of Chomsky’s theory. 127 Moreover, many regard the shifts in direction and
increasing abstraction of Chomsky’s framework as problematic. In the words of Robert Trask:
[Chomsky’s theory] was an abstract framework to begin with, but it has become
steadily more abstract, as its proponents, confronted by troublesome data, have
tended to posit ever greater layers of abstraction, in the hope of getting their
universal principles to apply successfully at some level of representation. Critics
have not been slow to see this retreat into abstraction as a retreat from the data
altogether, that is as an attempt to shoehorn the data into a priori principles which
themselves are sacrosanct. The more outspoken critics have declared the
[Chomsky] framework to be more a religious movement than an empirical
science. 128
Furthermore, attempts to find universals in grammatical rule systems necessarily depend
on first identifying substantive universals, such as the idea of nouns and verbs, that can serve as
the building blocks for analysis. In other words, the project of identifying rule systems depends
on the existence of a metalanguage that is distinct from all existing languages. Without such an
inventory of prior syntactic or semantic properties, one risks relying on familiar categories that
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may obscure other types of categories or may risk projecting European substantive properties
onto other languages. 129 And it is precisely this metalanguage that Chomsky and his followers
are finding so hard to develop.
Universal grammar has also faced a number of empirical challenges. The inability to
teach language to feral children is regarded by some as being more consistent with language
being learned through cognitive processes than it being an innate, genetic attribute. 130 Others
have pointed out that the fact that language structure evolves more quickly than genes indicates
that language cannot be genetically determined. 131
The problems with Chomsky’s insistence on abstraction to the exclusion of contextual
analysis is most evident in the debate his views of sparked over artificial intelligence (AI).
Recall that Chomsky believed that the proper goal of linguistics was the logical analysis of
linguistic structures that match people’s internal psychological processes. In so, he rejected the
approach that focused on context in a manner reminiscent of behaviorism and Whorfianism. In
Chomsky’s opinion, “probabilistic models give no particular insight into some of the basic
problems of syntactic structure.” 132 Instead, “Linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is
concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of
language . . . may provide evidence . . . but surely cannot constitute the subject-matter of
linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline.” 133 As a result, Chomsky criticized statistical
modeling and Bayesian approaches to AI for doing nothing more than trying to regenerate prior
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observations. 134 In Chomsky’s view, systems that simply regenerate past data do not improve
the scientific understanding of the phenomenon. 135
In this sense, Chomsky endorses what is sometimes called strong AI, which seeks to build
systems that perform tasks the same way people do, and rejects weak AI, which simply seeks to
build systems that work regardless of whether their structure models human cognition. 136 In
other words, strong AI employs a non-behaviorist approach in an attempt to gain insights into
human cognition. Weak AI uses a behaviorist approach to look for statistical regularities in large
datasets and treats the internal workings as a black box. 137 Chomsky denigrated the latter
approach as unlikely to yield any explanatory insights or general principles about the nature of
cognition. 138
Chomsky’s critique prompted a response from Peter Norvig, who is the Director of
Research and an AI expert at Google. 139 Norvig points to a paper by Leo Breiman arguing that
statistical modeling falls into two cultures. 140 The first culture attempts to create models that
mimic the mechanisms of nature as closely as possible. These results they produce provide
insights into the model, not nature. The second attempts to create algorithms that map inputs to
outputs without any expectation that they will do so in a manner that reflects the underlying
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nature of the phenomenon being modeled. 141 Although these latter models model reality
accurately, they make no attempt to correspond to the processes used by nature and thus provide
no analytical insight as to mechanisms. In short, they “describe[] what does happen, but . . .
[don’t] answer the question of why.” 142
Norvig argues that Chomsky’s views reflect his commitment to finding elegant
descriptions of the “deep whys” over “mere explanations of reality.” 143 The result is an approach
that regards the study of actual language as out of bounds and instead seeks to reduce the
mechanisms of language into an abstract, mathematical form. 144 While elegant, this acontextual
approach proved singularly ineffective in generating working AI, particularly when it comes to
language. 145
The exchange between Chomsky and his critics over the best approach to AI recapitulates
the overarching debate between linguistic relativity and universal grammar. One side favors
abstraction and fidelity to cognitive processes at the expense of the ability to explain the features
of actual languages and the meaning of actual expressions. The other side focuses on patterns
identified through empirical observation without any attempt to map those patterns onto
cognitive processes. Perhaps most importantly, modern practitioners of AI criticize the
dichotomy as overdrawn. Experiments with different forms of statistical modeling that are tied
to linguistic theory can reveal a great deal about that theory’s validity. 146
* * *
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At this point, the debate between linguistic relativity and universal grammar remains
unresolved. The ebbs and flows of the debate over the past few decades make it almost certain
that the last word has yet to be spoken. To the extent that a consensus exists, it seems to reject
the idea that language determines thought, but at the same time accepts that language influences
thought in important ways. From this perspective, “what we normally call ‘thinking’ is in fact a
complex set of collaborations between linguistic and nonlinguistic representations and
processes.” 147 The modern empirical evidence suggests that these mechanisms are quite
contextual. On a more fundamental level, the debate reflects the familiar methodological clash
between theory and empiricism to which the proper answer is that science needs both. 148
II.

LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND CONSTRUCTED LANGUAGES

The inconclusive state of the debate between these two schools of thought on the
relationship between language and thought does not stop it from having strong implications for
copyright. Given that the central claim of linguistic relativity is that the language a person
speaks affects the way they perceive and think about the world, one natural question regards the
merits of giving authors of constructed languages (“conlangs”) exclusive control over their
creations. 149 Constructed languages are those languages whose phonology, morphology, syntax,
and sometimes alphabet and vocabulary were intentionally devised by one or more humans. As
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such, constructed languages stand in contrast to natural or ethnic languages, which evolved
organically without any human control. 150
The debate whether permitting authors to copyright an entire language that they created
has important implications for key copyright concepts, including the idea-expression dichotomy,
the merger doctrine, and the exclusion of functional works. Part A lays out the different types of
constructed languages. Part B applies the insights of the debate over linguistic relativity.
A.

Types of Constructed Languages
Reflecting a long tradition that is usually traced back go Hildegard of Bingen’s Lingua

ignota during the 12th century, 151 people have devised more than 700 constructed languages over
the years, as compared with the roughly 5,000 languages currently being spoken today. Interest
appears to be burgeoning, as reflected by the number of courses on constructed languages
springing up in universities across the country. 152
The creation of a constructed language generally follows one of two paths. An a priori
approach builds a new language from whole cloth without any reference to earlier languages,
while a posteriori takes an existing language as its starting point. 153 Many scholars have pointed
out that this distinction is better regarded as a spectrum rather than as a strict dichotomy, since no
language is completely a priori. 154
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Constructed languages are also categorized by the purpose for which they are intended to
serve. Typically, they fall into one of three types: artistic languages, auxiliary languages, and
engineered languages.
1.

Artistic Languages

Many of the best known constructed languages are artistic in nature (artlangs).
Prominent examples include the multiple languages invented by J.R.R. Tolkien in The Lord of
the Rings and his other works, who regarded constructing languages as his “secret vice.” 155
Other prominent examples include Klingon (created for the Star Trek franchise), Na’vi (created
for the movie Avatar), and Dothraki and Valyrian (created for the television series, Game of
Thrones).
Tolkien undoubtedly regarded the act of constructing a languages to be expressive. In a
1931 address, Tolkien recounts an utterance during the middle of a boring lecture that revealed
that the person was working on a constructed language:
The man next to me said suddenly in a dreamy voice: “Yes, I think I shall express
the accusative case by a prefix!”
A memorable remark! . . . Just consider the splendour of the words! “I
shall express the accusative case. “ Magnificent! Not “it is expressed,” nor even
the more shambling “it is sometimes expressed,” nor the grim “you must learn
how it is expressed.” What a pondering of alternatives within one’s choice before
the final decision in favour of the daring and unusual prefix, so personal, so
attractive; the final solution of some element in a design that had hitherto proved
refractory. Here were no base considerations of the “practical,” the easiest for the
“modern mind,” or for the million – only a question of taste, a satisfaction of a
personal pleasure, a private sense of fitness. 156
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Tolkien followed it with an eloquent reflection on the “incipient pleasure found in linguistic
invention.” 157 In fact, Tolkien regarded the languages as more important than the stories: “The
‘stories’ were made rather to provide a world for the languages than the reverse.” 158
Authors of languages constructed for artistic purposes often assert copyrights over those
languages. For example, the Tolkien estate asserts that it holds a copyright in the languages that
Tolkien constructed. In response to a hypothetical question whether others can write stories set
in Middle Earth, the FAQ section of the estate’s website unequivocally says no. 159 Although the
website does not specify the legal basis for asserting this right or address the use of Tolkien’s
constructed languages, subsequent correspondence with counsel for the estate makes clear that
the estate believes that it holds a copyright in Tolkien’s constructed languages. 160 The FAQ
section for the webpage for “The Elvish Language Fellowship,” which appears to enjoy some
degree of approval from the Tolkien Estate, 161 takes the same position. 162 On the other hand, a
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fan magazine secured a legal opinion from the former general counsel of the National
Endowment for the Arts stating that Tolkien’s languages cannot be copyrighted. 163
These statements notwithstanding, the Tolkien estate does not appear to have brought any
lawsuits to enforce any copyrights in Tolkien’s constructed languages that may exist. 164 Wired
magazine does report that the estate sent a cease and desist letter to Tolkien linguist Helge
Fauskanger that successfully deterred him from publishing a sixty-page analysis of two
unpublished texts written in the Tolkien-created language, Quenya, 165 even though Fauskanger
believes that Tolkien’s languages cannot be copyrighted. 166 This case is somewhat atypical in
that the works being analyzed were unpublished, a consideration that militates against fair use. 167
Paramount Pictures has similarly taken steps to assert a copyright in Klingon. For
example, the studio once sent a cease and desist letter to the Klingon Language Institute (KLI)
asking it to stop using the word Klingon in its literature before subsequently giving KLI a
copyright and trademark license to Paramount’s intellectual property. 168 Since then, Paramount
and the KLI have enjoyed a more symbiotic relationship. 169
The copyrightability of Klingon did come closer to having its day in court in Paramount
v. Axanar, in which studio sued to block a crowd-funded fan film set in the Star Trek universe. 170
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The Language Creation Society moved for leave to submit an amicus brief arguing that
constructed languages were not copyrightable. 171 The court denied the motion, noting that
because it “d[id] not reach the issue of whether languages, and specifically the Klingon language,
are copyrightable . . . none of the information provided by Amicus is necessary to dispose of the
Motion to Dismiss.”172
The court later issued an opinion denying cross motions for summary judgment, holding
that the defendant’s works used elements protected by Paramount’s copyright and that the
defendant’s works did not constitute fair use. 173 The opinion’s discussion of copyrightability
focused primarily on the use of characters, the Vulcan and Klingon species, and particular
costumes. 174 The court also noted that Paramount and CBS had submitted evidence regarding
the use of other aspects of the Star Trek universe, including, most importantly for this Article,
the Klingon language. 175 The court sidestepped the issue whether Klingon is by itself
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copyrightable, stating, “Although each of these elements may not be individually original and
copyright protectable, they are ‘numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original
enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship,’ especially when
combined with the costumes and fictional characters and species, examples of which are
described above.” 176 The case was eventually settled, with Axanar accepting a license for its
preexisting twenty-minute work and pledging to adhere to Paramount’s new publicly stated
policy of withholding any objections to fan films that last fifteen minutes or consist no more than
two segments totaling thirty minutes or less. 177
2.

Auxiliary Languages

Auxiliary languages (auxlangs) are intended to provide a common basis for
communication for people from different language traditions. International auxiliary languages
(IAL) aspire to be used by everyone. The first IAL to gain widespread use was Volapük, which
was first described in 1879 and published as a book in 1880. 178 Volapük was superseded by the
publication of Esperanto in 1887, 179 which after passing through some doldrums is enjoying a
modest revival. 180 The International Auxiliary Language Association (IALA) was established in
1924 to promote IALs, creating its own language, Interlingua, in 1951. 181 After IALA closed its
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doors in 1953, the newly created Interlingua Division of Society of the Science Service took over
responsibility for promoting the language until 1966. 182
Other auxiliary languages are described as regional or zonal, in that they are intended to
be spoken on a regional rather than a global scale. Prominent examples include pan-Slavic
Interslavic, Germanic-based Tutonish, and African-based Afrihili. 183 A particularly interesting
example for purposes of this Article is palawa kani, which is an attempt by the Tasmanian
Aboriginal Center (TAC) to synthesize a coherent language out of fragments of twelve extinct
indigenous languages. 184
Auxiliary languages have not given rise to many copyright disputes. As a result, courts
have not occasion to address their copyrightability. Learned Hand did refer to Esperanto when
denying copyright protection to a list of 6,235 coined words that had no ascribed meaning. 185
The uncopyrightability of a list of words or symbols that the author had not given any meaning
says nothing about constructed languages, which have full vocabularies and grammar. At least
one court expressed skepticism regarding claims that constructed languages such as Esperanto
are uncopyrightable, calling such arguments “vulnerable” and “depend[ent] on arbitrary
definitions of words, adopted for undisclosed reasons” that border on “word games.” 186
In the absence of clear guidance, creators of constructed languages have followed a
variety of practices. The desire to have them widely spoken often leads authors to permit broad
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use and sometimes even consign them to the public domain. 187 For example, Esperanto’s
creator, L.L. Zamenhof, announced that Esperanto is the “property of society, and the author
renounces all personal rights in it forever.” 188
At the same time, some creators of auxiliary languages have attempted to use copyright
to protect their creations. For example, the Wikimedia Foundation’s 2014 Transparency Report
revealed that Wikipedia had refused the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre’s request to take down its
article on palawa kani “because copyright law simply cannot be used to stop people from using
an entire language or to prevent general discussion about the language. Such a broad claim
would have chilled free speech and negatively impacted research, education, and public
discourse — activities that Wikimedia serves to promote.” 189 Interestingly, the Centre’s claims
may not be based exclusively on copyright. 190 Filings to the Australian legislature mention a
wide range of international treaties and conventions on indigenous rights. 191 The Centre
discourages nonaborigines from speaking the language until the aborigines become competent in
it.
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3.

Engineered Languages

Once called research, experimental, or philosophical languages, engineered languages
(engelangs) are constructed languages designed to satisfy specific objective criteria. A fairly
new arrival is Toki Pona, created by Sonja Lang in 2001 192 that embodies Taoism by reducing
complexity and embracing minimalism by using simple sounds and roughly 120 words. 193
Consistent with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Toki Pona attempts to immerse people in the
moment and to induce positive thinking by using positive words. 194 In fact, Lang devised Toki
Pona to help her deal with depression. 195
Other engineered languages are constructed to embody certain logical principles with
intention of making language more precise. A particularly interesting example for the purposes
of this Article is Loglan, which sociologist James Cooke Brown created in 1955 in order to
conduct a real-world test of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis itself. Specifically, he designed the
language based on the principles of predicate logic in order to see if the structure of the language
shaped the way its speakers think. 196
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These categories are not always mutually exclusive. Many constructed languages span
more than one category. For example, Suzette Haden Elgin created Láadan both as an artistic
language as part of the Native Tongue series of novels as well as an engineered language
designed both to express the perceptions of women and to test the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 197
Engineered languages have given rise to occasional legal disputes. For example, tensions
began to flare with respect to Loglan during the 1980s, mostly out of frustration with the slow
pace with which Loglan’s creator, James Cooke Brown, was developing the language. These
tensions erupted into an outright schism when Brown responded to Robert LeChevalier’s
creation of computer flashcards to help study the language by demanding that LeChevalier sign a
statement acknowledging that Brown held the copyright in Loglan and pay Brown royalties to
use it. 198 In March 1987, Brown eventually sent LeChevalier a cease and desist letter asserting
that use of the term Loglan violated Brown’s trademark. The courts would eventually uphold the
Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s refusal to register the
trademark on the grounds that Loglan represented the generic name for a language. 199
B.

The Implications of the Linguistic Relativity Debate
The literature exploring the copyrightability of constructed languages is vanishingly thin,
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constructed language community.202 These commentaries conducted their analysis by applying
conventional doctrinal categories such as originality, fixation, the idea-expression dichotomy,
functionality, and fair use. The only mention of linguistic relativity is a passing reference during
the description of Loglan’s origins that contained no analysis of the theory. 203 The omission is
unfortunate because the debate over linguistic relativity has clear implications for the
copyrightability of constructed languages.
1.

Universal Grammar

Consider first universal grammar, which contends that all languages follow the same
innate structure. It has limited, but important, implications for the copyrightability of
constructed languages. If correct, universal grammar suggests that permitting authors to
copyright a constructed language poses no problem unless the protection includes the universal
structure that all languages must follow. Note that even this claim does not necessarily mean
that constructed languages cannot enjoy any copyright protection whatsoever. Universal
grammar applies only a language’s structural elements and appears to omit nonstructural aspects.
Copyrighting other aspects of a language thus pose no conceptual problems.
Moreover, as noted earlier, universal grammar’s proponents have struggled to articulate a
principled basis for determining what lies within the core of a language as opposed to the
periphery and which linguistic elements constitute part of Chomsky’s Minimalist Program. 204
The difficulties surrounding how to locate the boundary between the core and the periphery are
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reminiscent of Judge Learned Hand’s observation about levels of generality in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left
out. The last may be no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might only consist of its title; but there is a point in this series
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended. 205
At one level of generality, both of the plays at issue in that case were similarly about a young
Irish man and a young Jewish woman who become estranged from their families after they
secretly wed, only to become reconciled later. 206 At another level of generality, the plays are
quite different in terms of the role of religion, the device through which reconciliation occurs,
and the characterization of the fathers. 207 Whether the second play infringes the first depends on
the level of generality used to define what is the essence of each. Unfortunately, “[n]obody has
ever been able to fix that boundary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can.” 208
The theory of universal grammar offers an analytical framework that can provide some
traction on this question. Elements that reside in the core identified by the Minimalist Program
clearly belong on the idea side of the dichotomy. This framework does not provide a complete
solution, since there are many statements are properly regarded as falling with the province of
ideas instead of expression even though they are not language structure.
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2.

Linguistic Relativity

Linguistic relativity provides greater insight, militating in favor of imposing greater limits
on the copyrightability of constructed languages. The Supreme Court has recognized that
“choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the
compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity” may merit copyright protection even if the
components combined together are uncopyrightable. 209 As the Second Circuit has noted, “Every
kind of work at some level is . . . an arrangement of uncopyrightable ‘common elements.’ No
individual word is copyrightable, but the arrangement of words into a book is. No color is
copyrightable, but the arrangement of colors on canvas is.” 210 The Seventh Circuit similarly
upheld the copyrightability of certain greeting cards even though they were composed of
elements that were not separately copyrightable. 211 The court held that although elements such
as size, color, paper, ink border design, stripes, ellipses, and single-sided format “are not
individually capable of protection, just as individual words do not deserve copyright protection,
it is the unique combination of these common elements which form the copyrighted material. 212
Other judicial decisions concur, 213 as does the guidance issued by the Copyright Office. 214 That
said, the scope of copyright protection is “thin,” covering only the originality associated with the
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selection and arrangement of the uncopyrightable elements and not the uncopyrightable elements
themselves. 215
Consider the ordering of the three principal parts of a sentence: subject (S), verb (V), and
object (O). Simple mathematics reveals that there six possible orders in which to put these three
elements. 216 With such a limited set of possibilities, giving any author copyright protection in
one of them would be problematic. However, not all six occur with equal frequency among
natural languages. A 2016 survey of 5,252 languages found the following frequencies for each
pattern: SOV 43.3%, SVO 40.3%, VSO 9.5%, VOS 3.3%, OVS 0.7%, and OSV 0.3%. 217
Earlier studies identified similar patterns. 218
The creator of Klingon deliberately chose the OVS pattern and sounds that rarely occur in
natural languages in order to make them sound more alien. 219 The sound combinations also
made the language sound harsher, consistent with the characterization of Klingon culture as
bellicose and jingoistic. 220 Individually, the features may be uncopyrightable, but the
combination of these elements may be sufficiently creative to be copyrightable. In the words of
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Klingon’s creator, Marc Okrand, “There is no sound in Klingon the does not occur in any
number of natural languages, but the particularly inventory of sounds is unique to Klingon.” 221
Linguistic relativity introduces an additional consideration by implying that the saliences
and resistances embedded in a language’s structure makes certain concepts more memorable and
filters the way they perceive the world. If so, language structures become deeply functional and
fall closer to the idea side of the idea-expression dichotomy. The connection between language
structure and thought may in fact cause the two to merge and thus lose copyright protection,
because giving authors of constructed languages the exclusivity over a particular structure risks
giving those authors de facto control over how to induce a particular pattern of thought.
In this sense, linguistic relativity also has the potential to add the type of substantive
content to the idea-expression dichotomy that Learned Hand thought was unattainable. At the
same time, it threatens to undermine the Supreme Court’s reliance on the independence between
language and ideas deemed essential to justifying copyright protection, at least with respect to
the structure of a constructed language. 222
3.

Differences Among Types of Constructed Languages

In addition, different types of constructed languages naturally implicate the concerns of
copyright in different ways. For example, structural choices for artistic languages are likely to
be driven by expressive considerations. More functional works are less inherently expressive. 223
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For example, engineered languages tend to be primarily functional, as they are designed to
achieve some particular end. 224
Auxiliary languages are less susceptible to broad generalizations. Consider first IALs,
whose primary purpose is to provide all people with a common basis for communication. As
such, they are often regarded to be driven more by pragmatism than by commitment to strong
conceptual principles. 225
Interestingly, each of the key figures in the debate over linguistic relatively have offered
their views of IALs, adopting strikingly divergent positions. Chomsky did not address IALs in
his published, but he has discussed them in interviews. Although Chomsky’s belief in a
universal grammar might have led him to support the creation of a single language that all people
could speak, 226 his belief in language as a biological phenomenon led him to reject the idea that
any true language can be constructed. 227 Because it is a natural phenomenon, language can best
be (and perhaps only be) understood studying existing languages. 228 This led him to dismiss “the
concept of inventing a language’ as “very misleading” 229 and why he claimed Esperanto was not
a language and instead involved only “the invention of extremely superficial elements of
language.” 230 In addition, he regarded the desire for a universal language as being “based on an
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illusion.” 231 The need for subject matter to study made it “more efficient to have . . . a whole lot
of languages” than to teach a “parasitic” system that simplifies other languages. 232 Since all
natural languages are simply dialects of the one universal human grammar, and there is no reason
to prefer one over another. 233
The implications of linguistic relativity are less clear. Whorf shared Chomsky’s
antagonism toward IALs, but for very different reasons. Whereas for Chomsky the existence of
an inherent universal language made the differences embodied in natural languages nothing more
than superficial variations of no particular significance, Whorf thought that differences across
languages were essential attributes that must be preserved. Indeed, he “believe[d] that those who
envision a future world speaking only one tongue . . . hold a misguided ideal and would do the
evolution of the human mind the greatest disservice.” 234 “The only correctives” to the hegemony
of the point of view inherent in the structure of Western languages “lie in all those other tongues
which by aeons of independent evolution have arrived at different, but equally logical,
provisional analyses.” Thus, the nontranslatability of languages represented not just a barrier to
the construction of a single, universal language; it signals an important source of the diversity of
thought that IALs would homogenize. Whorf’s view that languages are tied to culture and are
inherently untranslatable necessarily entails that, in the words of one commentator, “there is no
chance to construct one, universal language.” 235
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Sapir, in contrast, adopted a much more sanguine stance toward IALs. As noted earlier,
Sapir saw a looser connection between linguistic structure and thought than did Whorf. 236 This
distance led Sapir to accommodate IALs to an extent Whorf could not. Sapir backed his
academic rhetoric with action. He played an active role in shaping the research program of the
International Auxiliary Language Association. 237 In addition to authoring a key memorandum
on IALs in 1925, 238 he also took a three-month sabbatical to conduct research for IALA in 1929,
served as IALA’s first Research Director from 1930-31, and served on its Advisory Board for
Linguistic Research from 1927 until his death in 1939. 239
Sapir’s support for IALs was also manifest in his scholarly writings. In his 1931 article
on “The Function of an International Auxiliary Language,” Sapir emphasized the unquestioned
“theoretical desirability” and “logical necessity” of IALs. 240 Not only would adoption of an IAL
avoid the “necessary evil” of the costs associated with translation and impaired comprehension;
the growing demands of modernity require a language that does more than “merely extend[] the
imperfections and provincialism” of prior languages and would instead incorporate a greater
degree of logic, richness, and creativity than any of its predecessors. 241 If successful, the
resulting IAL would provide a “broad base for every type of international understanding . . . for
every type of expression of the human spirit which is of more than local interest.” 242 His entry
on “Language” in the 1933 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, sounded similar themes, calling
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IALs a “logical necessity . . . in modern times” and criticizing claims of “the supposed
artificiality” of Esperanto and other IALs as “absurdly exaggerated.” 243 He saw less promise in
zonal languages, predicting that attempts to revive regional languages would fail in the face of
burgeoning internationalism. 244
Sapir and Whorf thus differed on IALs. While Sapir regarded them as very promising,
Whorf derided them as an unfortunate attempt that would homogenize thought along Western
lines. While clearly averse toward the universality of IALs, Whorf did not clarify whether he
thought that zonal auxiliary languages provide sufficient variation to support innovations in
thought.
Constructed languages serve values beyond the goals of serving as an outlet for creative
expression, pragmatically supporting international communication, and promoting logical
thinking. 245 IALs are often said to support substantive goals as well. For example, Sapir noted
providing the entire world with a common basis for communication would serve as “one of the
most potent symbols of the freedom of the human spirit that the world has yet known.” 246 He
predicted that, despite the growing importance of language as a symbol of cultural difference and
sovereignty, attempts by minority populations to revive regional languages would likely fail in
the face of burgeoning embrace of internationalism. 247
Esperanto has become “associated with an almost mystical humanism” centered on the
belief that adoption of a common language will reduce conflict and promote understanding,
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despite attempts in some quarters for it to remain ideologically neutral. 248 For example, L.L.
Zamenhof’s foundational pamphlet that launched Esperanto rejected “see[ing] Esperanto [as] just
a practical affair.” 249 Instead of “fear[ing] offending those people who want to use Esperanto
only for practical purposes,” he embraced “the sacred, grand and important idea that an
international language contains itself . . . brotherhood and justice among all peoples,” 250 themes
that Zamenhof would reiterate in his later speeches and writings. 251 Whether it was because of
the language itself or because of Zamenhof’s charismatic vision, the community of Esperanto
speakers has developed into a movement committed to Zamenhof’s values including “pacifism,
antimilitarism, internationalism, [and] predominantly left-leaning and progressive causes.” 252
The depth of the accession of these values is demonstrated tragically by Esperantists’ persecution
by Hitler and Stalin. 253
Zonal auxiliary languages embody values that overlap the internationalist and universalist
commitments associated with IALs. Part of the motivation for pursuing zonal constructed
languages is pragmatic: a common language is easier to create and to learn when the speakers’
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native tongues belong to the same language family. 254 With respect to substantive values, some
are quite similar to those espoused by IALs, such as greater participation in transnational edemocracy and support for computer translation. 255
But proponents of zonal auxiliary languages advance them for other reasons that are quite
different from those associated with IALs. Some proponents see zonal auxiliary languages as a
defense against the effect that the growing hegemony of English is having on other cultures. 256
Others regard them in more affirmatively constitutive terms, seeing them as a means to promote
a sense of ethnicity 257 in a manner similar to revitalized languages, such as Hebrew, Irish,
Cornish, Hawaiian, Māori, and Welsh. 258 Zonal auxiliary languages may thus represent a
potential revival of the Romantic nationalism that characterized the 19th Century. 259 In the case
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of palawa kani, its creators hope that its use will build a more cohesive sense of community by
fostering a Tasmanian aboriginal way of thinking in the manner environed by linguistic
relativity, to the point where they hope to forbid nonaborigines from using the language until it is
better established. 260 Far from seeking to provide a universal basis for communication, zonal
auxiliary languages are necessarily confined to “small, fragmented, often ideologically
homogenous groups of speakers, sharing a common standpoint to which the conlang in question
has only a secondary, instrumental role.” 261 Unlike IALs, universal acceptance is not the goal
for zonal auxiliary languages. These developments have made “traditional claims of neutrality
and universalism” seem “outdated.” 262
Linguistic relativity provides an additional impetus to this goal. Not only would a zonal
auxiliary language provide a common basis for communication within this group; speaking a
language of the same structure would further build community by inducing them to perceive the
world in the same way (although the similarity of the languages within the zone may limit the
marginal impact of this effect). Universal grammar would see no such benefit. The existence of
a uniform structure that spans all languages would render constructing a shared language a poor
tool for constituting smaller communities within the larger society.
The constitutive role to auxiliary languages can have a dark side as well. A 2012 New
Yorker article described how amateur linguist John Quijada accepted an invitation to and
attended a university conference focusing on the engineered language he created known as
Ithkuil only to distance himself from that intellectual community out of concerns of having his
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language associated with pseudoscience, far-right pan-Slavic nationalism, terrorism, and a
potential cult. 263 Authors of other constructed languages have expressed similar misgivings
about their lack of control over the languages they created. 264
4.

Copyright as a Mechanism for Control

Constructed languages thus face a delicate balance. On the one hand, their vitality often
depends on their being adopted by a sufficient number of people to maintain viability. This is
particularly true for auxiliary languages, whose goal is to increase people’s ability to
communicate across language boundaries. 265 The benefits of scale counsel in favor of removing
limits on people’s ability to access the language, although these benefits would eventually
exhibit diminishing marginal returns and would be less important for artistic languages, whose
aesthetic goals are not necessarily closely tied to widescale use.
At the same time, other considerations tilt in favor of allowing creators of constructed
languages to exercise a degree of stewardship and control. Some degree of governance may be
necessary to give a constructed language the stability and uniformity it needs to thrive. But
adoption of a constructed language is voluntary, and participants always remain free to divide the
community by starting a variant of their own. 266
Consider the example of Esperanto. As questions arose about the optimal rate with
which the language should evolve, Esperanto’s founder came to believe that promoting the
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adoption of Esperanto depended on a degree of stability. 267 He therefore took the position that
“the foundation of Esperanto must strictly remain absolutely unchanged” until several nations
had adopted it. 268 A schism eventually erupted when Louis Couturat presented the Delegation
for the Adoption of an International Language with a new language based on Esperanto called
Ido, which became the first of many offshoots of Esperanto, generally called Esperantidos. 269
These have largely faded from the scene while Esperanto has survived, an outcome some
attribute in part to the guidance of the Universal Esperanto Association, which has largely
resisted calls for significant change. 270
Nor was this dynamic unique to Esperanto. Volapük split into two when supporters
became frustrated with its creator’s reluctance to expand the language. 271 Lojban and the
Logical Language Institute split from Loglan and the Loglan Institute over disagreements with
the creator’s assertions of control. 272 The schisms hurt the overall development of the language
and divided the number of speakers into smaller groups. 273 Conversely, the leadership of
Klingon creator Marc Okrand is generally regarded as having had beneficial effects. 274
Similar patterns can be found in open source software projects, which similarly depend
on voluntary acceptance by a broad community in order to succeed. 275 Many people complain
that the existence of too many small changes, each pushed through by an engineer attempting to
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leave a mark on a project, can serve as a major barrier to adoption. 276 Open source projects can
also fork either because of mismanagement by the current leadership or from a desire to push the
project in a different direction. 277 The classic example is Unix, which shattered into multiple
variants on both the commercial and the academic side. 278 Linux, in contrast, has remained
unified to date, because of key management reforms and avoidance of personality disputes. 279
Such risks are always present for both constructed languages and open source projects.
Just as the nature of open source give supporters the right to fork a project, speakers of a
language always have the right to begin creating and speaking a different variant of the
language. 280 The open source solution has been the adoption of a strong norm against forking
and reliance on strong central leadership by a so-called “benevolent dictator” or a governing
body. 281 The term, dictator, is a tad misleading: While leaders exercise gatekeeper control in the
short run, the community remains free over the long haul to liberate themselves from any
strictures imposed if those leaders are not sufficiently responsive to the needs of the
community. 282
And sometimes, the desire for control comes not from the need to regulate the rate of
change or personal disputes, but rather from a desire to use language to build solidarity within a
community, exemplified by palawa kani’s attempt to exclude nonaborigines from speaking it. 283
Alternatively, it may implicate personality theory by allowing the constructed language’s creator
to control the ideas and communities with which it is associated.
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Copyright represents one of the principal means for asserting this type of control,
reflected by the Tolkien estate’s claim of copyrights in elvish, 284 James Cooke Brown’s
assertions of a copyright in Loglan, 285 and the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centers’ claim of a
copyright in palawa kani. 286 It is also the device employed by the open source community to
protect its values: Rather than consign open source software to the public domain, authors of
open source software copyright the code and license it subject to the requirement that any code
built from it also be open source. 287
To the extent that such concerns have validity, they strengthen arguments for giving
constructed languages the benefit of copyright protection. As the example of open source
demonstrates, control can be used to ensure that a language remains open as well as to assert
exclusive control, if the rightsholder deems that doing so is in their best interest. 288 They are
likely to be well positioned to act as good stewards so long as their personal interests align with
the promoting the success of the constructed language. 289
III.

LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY AND SOFTWARE

Although the copyrightability of constructed languages is a fascinating topic, the
analogous questions around software carry far more practical importance. In terms of
copyrightability, the uncertainty that once surrounded whether computer programs were eligible
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286
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to receive copyright protection was largely resolved by legislation enacted in 1980. 290 The
precise scope of that protection is less clear. In one of the most hotly anticipated copyright
decisions in quite some time, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to both issues in Google
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. 291 The Court had granted certiorari on the Federal Circuit’s
conclusions both that application programming interfaces (APIs) are copyrightable and that
copying them did not constitute fair use but chose to dispose of the case on fair use grounds
without addressing copyrightability.292
In terms of copyrightability, courts generally distinguish between copying the actual lines
of code (called the “literal elements” of the computer program) and the code’s sequence,
structure, and organization (SSO) (called the computer program’s “non-literal elements”). 293
The Supreme Court’s decision not to address copyrightability was unfortunately, as the federal
courts of appeals have divided over the copyrightability of SSO, with six circuits holding that

45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
Id. at 120–21.
290
Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, sec. 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028–29 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
117); see also Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc. 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1196, 1198 (2021) (recounting the history of
Congress’s deliberations over and resolution of the copyrightability of computer programs).
291
141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
292
Id.. at 1190, 1197.
293
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Comput. Assocs. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992); and Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d
1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); accord MiTek Holdings, Inc .v. Arce Eng’g Co.,, 89 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir. 1996);
Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc, 26 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994), supplemented on denial of
reh’g, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995); Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Syss., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1495 n.23 (10th
Cir. 1993); Whelan Assocs. Inc.. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Google,
141 S. Ct. at 1191 (using the phrase SSO with seeming approval).
290
290

53

protection is possible if the selection and arrangement is sufficiently original 294 and with one
circuit holding that SSO represents an uncopyrightable method of operation. 295
An article on the application of linguistic theory is not the appropriate venue for resolving
this dispute. 296 Instead, my purpose is to examine what light, if any, the debate over linguistic
relativity sheds on the protection of a computer program’s nonliteral elements. Indeed, its
insights into the connection between the structure of language and functionality can guide the
assessment of the impact of extending copyright protection to a software package’s structural
elements.
A.

Universal Grammar
At first glance, a theory that asserts the existence of a single universal grammar would

seem to be loath to extend copyright protection to SSO. Giving an author exclusive rights over
the one possible language structure would be tantamount to giving that author control over the
entire function of language.
Closer inspection reveals that such concerns are likely overstated. Recall that universal
grammar presumes that human language follows a universal structure that is genetically coded
into all people, demonstrated by children’s ability to acquire language with minimal exposure to
it. 297 This rationale does not generalize to software because computers are not limited by the
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genetics that govern human beings. The structures that software can adopt are thus not limited to
the structures underlying human language, making extending copyright protection to a software
package’s SSO less problematic.
B.

Linguistic Relativity
SSO copyrights raise greater concerns under linguistic relativity. The central claim of the

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that language structures shape the way people perceive the world by
making certain aspects mandatory and more salient while deemphasizing others. Although the
mechanism that linguistic relativity envisions is a matter of human cognition, it has a direct
analogue in software design. Software was once created as a single, integrated whole, but over
time software architects found it convenient to break larger programs down into smaller
subroutines. 298
Subroutines require a predefined interface that other programs can use to call upon their
services. For example, software packages must typically know the name of the subroutine, the
content and format of the inputs the subroutine needs to perform its functions, and the content
and format of the subroutine’s output. 299 To use the example cited in Google v. Oracle, a
subroutine called max that determines which of two integers (in this case 4 and 6) is larger could
be called through the subroutine call max(4,6) and be expected to return the number 6. Note that
more complex subroutines also need rules on how to respond to unusual situations, such as
incomplete data, improper syntax, parameters that fall outside the range of expected values. 300
For example, anyone with even minimal experience using the World Wide Web knows that
Vinton G. Cerf, APIs, Standards, and Enabling Infrastructure, COMM. ACM, May 2019, at 5, available at
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299
Id.
300
Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1193.
298

55

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) returns the error message, “404 Not Found,” when a call is
submitted for a webpage that does not exist. 301
The SSO at issue in Google v. Oracle reflects an added level of complexity. The
developers of Sun Java did more than just create subroutines, which they called methods, each
with its own implementing code. 302 They also grouped similar methods into what they called
classes and in turn grouped similar classes into libraries they called packages. 303 They then
relied on this hierarchy to establish the syntax that must be used to call the subroutine. To use
the example discussed above, Sun Java’s syntax requires the call to specify the name of the
relevant package (java.lang), class (Math), and method (max) along with the parameters
required by the method being called, which in this case yields the following link:
java.lang.Math.max(4,6). 304 The parties refer to this type of link as the declaring code, which
served as the primary focus of the case. 305
Although the Court did not address copyrightability, its fair use discussion provides
interesting indications that help inform that inquiry. When focusing on the nature of the
copyrighted work, the Court indicated that computer programs differ from purely aesthetic works
such as “books, films and many other ‘literary works’” in that they “almost always serve
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functional purposes.” 306 Computer code thus inevitably involves a mixture of expressive and
functional features, which forces courts to confront difficult questions about which those aspects
are protectible and which are not. 307
The Court also found that APIs are different from other types of software. In contrast to
the typical computer program, APIs’ declaring code play a distinctive role in inherently binding
four types of elements: (1) Sun Java’s system for dividing up computing tasks in a particular
way, which according to the Court “no one claims is a proper subject of copyright”; (2) the
general idea of organizing tasks into a hierarchy, which the Court concluded was
uncopyrightable; (3) the specific commands used to obtain the services of a subroutine, which
Oracle did not suggest was copyrightable; and (4) the code implementing particular subroutines,
which everyone agrees is copyrightable but Google did not copy. 308 The only creativity involved
is in choosing declaring names that programmers would find “intuitively easy to remember.” 309
The Court further took notice of the testimony “drawing [a] critical line between usercentered declaratory code and the innovative implementing code.” 310 From this, the Court
concluded that the declaring code embedded in user interfaces “differs to some degree from the
mine run of computer programs” in that they “inherently b[i]nd together uncopyrightable ideas
(general task division and organization) and new creative expression (Android’s implementing
code).” 311 Moreover, software systems like Java Sun and Android drive their “value in
significant part . . . from the value that those who do not held copyrights, namely, computer
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programmers, invest of their own time and effort to learn the API’s system” and from
“encourag[ing] programmers to learn and to use that system.” 312 This inherently close tie
between declaring code and functionality places it “further . . . from the core of copyright” that
other types of computer programs and “points in the direction of fair use.” 313
The Supreme Court’s assertion that no one asserts that the particular manner in which
Sun Java organizes tasks is copyrightable is subject to question. 314 Under Feist and its progeny,
the copyrightability of compilations of uncopyrightable elements turns on whether the selection
and arrangement of those elements was sufficiently original to merit copyright protection. 315
The Federal Circuit’s decision on copyrightability thus acknowledged Oracle’s concession that
the idea of employing the package-class-method structure is not copyrightable but held that
Oracle could copyright “its particular way of naming and organizing” the packets, classes, and
methods in its software package. 316
The Google Court acknowledged that the names around which the declaring code is built
represent a certain kind of creativity, 317 but failed to acknowledge the possibility of a copyright
in the selection and arrangement of otherwise uncopyrightable elements acknowledged in Feist.
This omission is in deep tension with the manner in which the Court described the software, in
which it noted that “[a]n API divides and organizes the world of computing tasks in a particular
way.” 318 This involves the selection of “precisely which set of potentially millions of different
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tasks we want to have our Java-based computer systems perform and how we want those tasks
arranged and grouped.” 319
C.

Modularity Theory as the Bridge Between Languages and Software
Most importantly for the purposes of this article, the Court came tantalizingly close to

invoking the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis when it drew a “rough analogy” between natural languages
and “the declaring code’s organizational features.” 320 The declaring code “divides into sets of
concepts a world that in certain respects other languages might have divided differently” in much
the same manner as natural languages. 321 This reasoning draws a direct parallel between the
manner in which both software and language channel a complex reality into a particular
conceptual structure. The computer science literature on modular systems has shown how the
interfaces necessarily make certain information visible and other information hidden 322 and how
those decisions predetermine the ways different tasks can interact with one another, which
ultimately determines the functionality of the overall system. 323
The computer science literature thus highlights how a software system’s interface
selectively increase the salience of certain information and downplays the importance of others
in much the same manner as natural languages under linguistic relativity. To the extent that the
structure of natural languages embodies a certain world view, so does a software packages SSO.
In addition, the deep connection between interface design and the system’s functionality adds
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another level of depth to the link between the design of a software interface and its functionality
(and the concomitant implications for copyrightability) identified by the Court.
The analogy between modular software and natural language systems potentially
provides new insight and analytical support for linguistic relativity. The fact that the process of
screening and channeling information plays an equally important role in systems that are
intentionally devised suggests that it is not simply the result of biology, linguistics, or the limits
of human cognition. 324 The incorporation of parallel solutions in such widely disparate contexts
suggests that it is best understood as a reflection of the process for managing complex systems
through near decomposition identified by Nobel laureate Herbert Simon. 325
Modularity theory also explains how the structural choices embodied in a particular
architecture become institutionalized into an industry’s organizational and intellectual culture. 326
The tendency is captured in what has become known as Conway’s Law, which asserts, in the
words of two commentators, that “[t]he structure of any system designed by an organization is
isomorphic to the structure of the organization.” 327 Melvin Conway’s original formation
envisions that organizational structure of the design team determines the design and envisioned
that the principal mechanisms was communication flows. 328 Architectures become enshrined as
technological paradigms that filter people’s perceptions of which directions seem the most
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promising. 329 Subsequent scholars have suggested that architectural commitments influence
communication channels by filtering the information that passes through an organization. 330
Technologies that are embedded in a larger system become part of a design hierarchy that
entrenches a particular technological agenda. 331 As Conway noted, designs that have become
entrenched end up driving the organizational structure instead of the other way around. 332
The presence of this device in both natural languages and software packages suggests that
linguistic relativity has roots in the problems posed by all complex systems. If so, the existence
of modular structures in other domains suggests that the mechanism underlying Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis is based on robust principles that are foundational. The fundamental nature of such
modularity is confirmed by the fact that it is a feature of many other biological systems that have
nothing to do with cognition, including pathogen structure, gene networks, protein interaction
networks, and cell networks. 333
Most interestingly for purposes of this Article, scholars have also used modularity to
explore human cognition. Most notably, Jerry Fodor advanced his Modularity Thesis, which
holds that the brain includes certain innate “vertical” faculties that perform predetermined,
domain specific functions that produce a narrow range of outputs based on limited set of
mandatory inputs in much the same manner as subroutines (the modules) that support broader
“horizontal” faculties that operate as the central system that integrates the unordered mass of
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information collected from a variety of sources. 334 In addition, modules such as language act
largely autonomous from central control in a manner similar to a reflex. 335 His modularity thesis
drew insights computer science, although some key differences remain. 336 Indeed, he discusses
it in terms of limiting inputs and encapsulating information in a manner almost identical to
computer scientists. 337
Fodor did not find “any need to deny the Whorfian point that the kinds of concepts one
has may be profoundly determined by the character of the natural language that one speaks.” 338
Indeed, Fodor recognized that a person’s experiences will determine which faculties actually get
employed. 339 Fodor’s key difference with Whorf is that he does not regard the human mind as a
blank slate whose content is determined by the stimuli to which it is exposed. 340 Instead, it
already possesses key innate faculties even in its original state. 341 Although Fodor’s views were
built on the innate faculties underlying Chomsky’s universal grammar, Chomsky disagreed with
Fodor’s distinction between the central system and modules that operate largely independent of
that central system as well as Fodor’s belief that the central system could not be fully
understood. 342
Fodor’s vision of language as a reflex encapsulated in a module is related to his claim
that people think in the “Language of Thought,” which similarly posits that thinking occurs in
abstract terms that are connected to specific languages only through a process of hypothesis
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formation and testing. 343 In so arguing, Fodor adopts the position reflected in Pinker’s claim,
noted earlier, that humans think in “mentalese” independent of any particular language. 344
The Language of Thought Hypothesis (often called “LOTH”) has generated a large
academic literature exploring its tenets both philosophically and empirically in much the same
manner as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 345 If correct, it suggests that ideas and expression may
not be as independent as current copyright doctrine presumes. For example, Anthony D’Amato
has noted that all of Chomsky’s examples to illustrate his universal grammar “depend[] upon the
meanings of the words in the sentence.” 346 This in turn suggested “that it is a very short step
from claiming that there is an inherent grammar importuned in our brains to saying there are
inherent meanings to words.” 347
Linguistic relativity’s central proposition humans think in terms of specific languages as
opposed to pure ideas independent of language actually cuts against the unity of ideas and
expression, although it does suggest a connection between ideas and the structure of the language
in which that expression is embodied. This connection inherent in mentalese is not a product of
the inclusions and exclusions reflected in a language’s structure make certain types of concepts
more salient, understandable, and memorable. Moreover, the entire idea that language can
influence thought necessarily presupposes a degree of independence between the two. 348
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The debates over these propositions have yet to be resolved and probably never will be.
Whatever their resolution, key copyright concepts such as the idea-expression dichotomy and the
merger doctrine hang in the balance.
CONCLUSION
To date, copyright scholarship has almost completely overlooked the linguistics and
cognitive psychology literature analyzing the connection between language and thought. An
exploration of the two major strains of this literature, universal grammar and linguistic relativity,
offer insights into the copyrightability of both constructed languages and the type of software
packages at issue in Google v. Oracle recently decided by the Supreme Court.
Linguistic relativity theory promises to provide intellectual traction on the heretofore
intractable challenge of distinguishing between protectible expression and unprotectible ideas.
Analysis of the principles of linguistic relativity also suggests that the filtering function
performed both by natural languages and APIs is best understood as an application of modularity
theory as means for managing complex systems The robustness of this solution across a wide
range of domains attests to its fundamental nature. Moreover, Fodor’s application of modularity
theory and the Language of Thought Hypothesis to human cognition, if correct, pose a
fundamental challenge to the idea-expression dichotomy.
The application of the insights of linguistic relativity eloquently demonstrate the benefits
of incorporating linguistics and cognitive psychology into the analysis of copyright. Even
though many areas in both fields remain hotly contested, an appreciation of the terms, scope, and
trends in the debate would enhance our comprehension of copyright.
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